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Abstract:
This article critically assesses the compliance model of employment standards (ES) enforcement
through a study of monetary employment standards violations in Ontario, Canada. The findings
suggest that, in contexts where changes to the organization of work deepen insecurity for
employees, models of enforcement that emphasize compliance over deterrence are unlikely to
effectively prevent or remedy ES violations.
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Introduction
Inadequate employment standards (ES) enforcement is a widely acknowledged policy problem
across jurisdictions. There is growing recognition that the changing nature of employment fuels
precariousness in labour markets, and creates an environment in which employees face greater
risk of experiencing ES violations. At the lower end of the labor market, in industries such as
cleaning, food services, and accommodation, the increasing prevalence of sub-contracting and
outsourcing further intensifies competition and makes ES violations a routine strategy of labor
cost containment (Weil 2010, 2014; Milkman, González and Ikeler 2012; Bernhardt, Spiller and
Polson 2013). The limited resources available to labor inspectorates (ILO 2006, para. 370) and
the dominance of a reactive, complaints-based enforcement system (Weil and Pyles 2006) means
that only a small fraction of ES violations are redressed in many jurisdictions.
Some jurisdictions have attempted to buttress workplace protections through the adoption
of reforms to their ES enforcement systems (Davidov 2010; Weil 2014; Amengual and Fine
2016). Many of these reforms reflect a ‘compliance’ model of enforcement, which entails
assumptions about the nature of violations and how regulation should be implemented. The
compliance model presumes violations to be largely exceptional rather than normal behavior and
due primarily to a lack of knowledge among regulated parties (Gunningham 2010). It casts
regulated parties as interested in legal compliance, and therefore privileges soft-touch modes of
regulation. The compliance model’s conception of violations and the behavior of regulated
parties diverges sharply from a deterrence model of regulation, which views non-compliance
with the law as often intentional behavior driven by a cost-benefit calculus and warranting
punishment (Pearce and Tombs 1990).
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This article challenges the theoretical assumptions of the compliance model in the
context of ES enforcement through a case study of monetary ES violations1– or what is known
colloquially as “wage theft” – in Ontario, Canada. As in other jurisdictions, the Government of
Ontario’s recent efforts to improve ES enforcement draw heavily from the compliance paradigm.
Among other changes, starting in the mid-2000s the Ontario Ministry of Labour (MOL)
produced more promotional material for employers and employees on their respective rights and
responsibilities under the Employment Standards Act (ESA) and made greater use of self-help
and settlements to expedite the resolution of ES problems. Yet an analysis of a previously
unavailable source of administrative data on ES enforcement in the province demonstrates how
the compliance framework alone is a deficient model on which to base reforms to workplace
regulation. Indeed, the empirical findings offered herein reveal a disjuncture between central
premises of the compliance model and employees’ experience of monetary ES violations.
Contrary to the compliance model’s emphasis on empowered and cooperative self-regulation, ES
complaint data suggest that imbalances in workplace power constrain the exercise of employee
voice and make seeking legal redress a risky venture for employees. The characteristics of the ES
complaints that are investigated and validated by the MOL also suggest that monetary violations
of ES are frequently not the result of ignorance or incompetence on the part of employers.
Rather, the relatively large median dollar value associated with monetary violations, and the low
rates of recovery of MOL-issued monetary orders, point toward the intentionality of violations
and employer recalcitrance in the enforcement process. Findings from this Ontario-based case
study thereby suggest that, in contexts where changes to the organization of work deepen
insecurity for employees and augment employer power, models of enforcement that emphasize
compliance over deterrence are unlikely to effectively prevent or remedy ES violations and can
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exacerbate regulatory degradation (Tombs and Whyte 2013). Effective workplace regulation that
helps pre-empt ES violations requires enforcement models that start from a dual recognition of
workplace power imbalances and the likelihood that many violations are intentional.
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts. Section one defines the features of a
compliance model of enforcement and the related notion of the enforcement pyramid, contrasting
more deterrence oriented approaches. Turning to the empirical analysis, section two describes the
dominance of a compliance orientation in the enforcement of the Ontario ESA with attention to
the case of monetary ES violations. Against this backdrop, it provides a profile of the reporting
behaviour of complainants and features of complaints that run counter to the image of mutual
interest and cooperation between employers and employees and the unintentionality of
violations. By way of conclusion, section three asserts that a model of ES monetary violations
that assumes they are frequently intentional activity is a necessary starting point for improved
enforcement.
Before proceeding, a note on methods and sources is warranted. As the chief
administrative data set retained under the provincial ESA, and the principal data source for this
paper, the MOL’s Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) contains information on all
complaints submitted and their outcomes, violations detected, inspections conducted,
settlements, the use of enforcement mechanisms, wage recovery, and Ontario Labour Relations
Board Reviews (commonly known as Appeals). A central feature of the ESIS is that it provides a
nearly-complete census of Ontario's ES enforcement activities and their outcomes that is not
otherwise publically available. But while it captures a variety of information related to the ESA
and its enforcement, the ESIS is primarily a tracking and record-keeping system. Like other
administrative data, it has several limitations: first and foremost, as an indicator of reactive
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enforcement practices, it only captures the experiences of those who are successful in entering
the administrative system. The vast majority of employees who experience a violation do not
complain; hence, they are not captured in administrative data (Weil and Pyles 2006; Noack,
Vosko and Grundy 2015). Second, as it was not designed for research purposes, ESIS data have
not undergone the same quality control and data verification processes as survey data from large
statistical agencies. Thus, the dataset includes inconsistencies, some of which appear to result
from discrepancies in complainants' reporting (such as complainants who indicate that they are
"still working" for an "out of business" employer), and some of which appear to occur when one
aspect of the database is updated, but additional information remains in the system (such as when
a complaint is listed as being "denied" but also has an Order to Pay Wages issued for it).2 In
many instances, it is not possible to verify which information is correct; for this reason, in the
ensuing analysis, the general approach is to let these inconsistencies persist.
I. The Dominance of Compliance in Employment Standards Enforcement
For as long as there has been wage labor, there have been unpaid wage claims. The reason lies in
the near universal practice of paying employees in arrears – after they have provided service.
This makes wage workers (i.e., employees) their employers’ creditors in between pay days, and
like all creditors they run the risk of not being paid. However, wage employees are not like
ordinary creditors in many ways. Unlike commercial creditors, they do not have the ability to run
credit checks or to diversify credit risks among a number of different employers. But, more
fundamentally, they stand in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency with their employers
(Wright 2015).
Historically, most wage protection laws aimed to facilitate wage recovery and thus
created legal mechanisms to enhance wage workers' ability to recover what they were owed.
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These are compliance measures in the sense that they aim to ensure that employers fulfil their
contractual obligations. There has been much less appetite to deploy deterrence measures that
punish employers for their failure to pay wages in the first place by making non-payment a
regulatory offense or a crime.3 Yet questions relating to the use of compliance and deterrence
measures have been and remain a matter of public concern. For instance, in Canada, from 1935
to 1954, it was a crime to intentionally not pay the minimum wage established by a law of
Canada (S.C. 1935, c. 56; Tucker 2016). Most recently, these issues have been foregrounded by
campaigns that target “wage theft” by employers (e.g., Judson and Francisco-McGuire 2012).
There is also a longstanding debate in the legal literature about the use of compliance and
deterrence approaches to regulatory enforcement (Reiss 1984; Gunningham 2010: Reynaers and
Parrado 2016). Compliance and deterrence theories are based on fundamentally different
assumptions about the causes of legal violations and their normative significance. Applied to
questions of workplace regulation, deterrence theory is premised on the idea that a substantial
proportion of labor standards violations, including non-payment of wages, are caused by the
intentional actions of employers who have determined they are better off not complying with
their legal obligations. Therefore, the goal of the law should be to alter employers’ behavior by
raising the risk of being caught and/or increasing the penalties for breaching the law. An
emphasis on this goal will generate specific and general deterrence thereby shaping the future
behavior of both the employer found to be in violation and of employers generally (Pearce and
Tombs 1990; Tombs and Whyte 2013a). Moreover, deterrence theorists make the normative
claim that wage violations should not be treated as a private problem resolved by compensating
the individual for her or his loss, but rather should be viewed as a serious social hazard that not
only harms individual employees and their dependents but that also contributes to a climate in
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which processes of evasion, erosion and abandonment could lead to a gloves-off labor market in
which public decency is sacrificed to the drive to maximize profits at any cost (Almond and
Colover 2012).
In contrast, compliance theory is premised on the idea that violations, including
presumably breaches of the duty to pay, are the result of employer ignorance and incompetence
rather than intentional behavior. The primary strategy for improving employers’ performance of
their legal obligations, therefore, is to provide information and compliance assistance on the
assumption that most employers will respond by becoming law abiding citizens. Indeed, in
particularly optimistic versions of compliance theory, employers will go beyond the minimum
that is required and a culture of compliance will foster even higher standards of behavior. The
few bad apples that do not respond to compliance measures will then be isolated and subject to
deterrence measures. This approach is seen to be particularly appropriate in the employment
context, where regulations apply to individuals and corporations engaged in beneficial economic
activities. As a result, non-payment of wages is principally framed as an instrumental problem
rather than a moral one for which punishment is merited (Almond and Colover 2012). Figure 1
below provides a somewhat simplified but nevertheless accurate account of key differences
between deterrence and compliance approaches to enforcement.
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Figure 1: Features of Deterrence and Compliance Regulatory Paradigms

Ayres and Braithwaite's (1992) responsive regulation approach aimed to transcend the debate
between those who favor stronger state regulation (deterrence) and those who favor more selfregulation (compliance). Their key idea is that rather than needing to choose between compliance
and deterrence, both elements can be combined effectively in a way that is responsive to the
regulatory context. The model developed by these authors, and for which responsive regulation
is best known, is the enforcement pyramid which starts with persuasion at the base and provides
that if and only if this fails to secure compliance, regulators should escalate to the next
enforcement action that has more bite and if, and only if, this action fails escalate again,
eventually reaching the most serious sanctions with the greatest deterrence effects. The
assumption of the pyramid is that most regulatory activity will take place at the bottom and that
fewer and fewer regulatory interventions will be necessary as regulatory interventions become
more forceful. The hammer of deterrence is necessary, but should largely remain hidden.
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The enforcement pyramid and its preference for and heavy reliance on compliance
measures assume that violations are exceptional, the result of ignorance or incompetence, and
that most employers are predisposed to obey the law. While Ayres and Braithwaite insist that the
enforcement pyramid is designed to address both those who are inclined to virtue and those who
are not, they embrace the republican idea that “most citizens comply with the law most of the
time because it seems wrong to them to break the law” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 94). The
model is rooted in Third Way political discourse which imagines that antagonistic social
relations can be transcended by civic republicanism’s emphasis on the empowering potential of
dialogue and participation (Mascini 2012; Tombs and Whyte 2013). The model of the
enforcement pyramid further entails transposition from citizen to corporation, which underlies
the “moralization of the corporation” (Shamir 2010), without making any reference to the
political economic context in which it operates.
The omission of political economic context is critical, especially when neo-liberal modes
of governance weaken state capacity to regulate against the interests of profit-maximizing
corporations, and undermine the ability of workers to act collectively to defend their interests
within the corporation (Harvey 2005; Tombs and Whyte 2010). The impact of such
transformations on the changing nature of employment provides grounds to question some of the
tenets of the compliance model for ES enforcement (Davidov 2010; Tucker 2013; Dickens 2014;
Vosko, Grundy and Thomas 2016). Weil (2014) demonstrates that in many sectors of the U.S.
economy, employment relations have been transformed through a process of fissuring which
leads businesses to avoid having employees through contracting out, franchising and the use of
extended supply chains. The result is that employment is being pushed into increasingly
competitive environments where employers are under enormous pressure to reduce costs, and
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since labor costs often comprise a considerable portion of total costs in these industries the
incentive to violate the law grows, resulting in a greater propensity to engage in intentionally
evasive actions.4 Other researchers document the spread of precarious employment in Ontario,
which parallels the conditions described by Weil in the United States, highlighting asymmetrical
power relations resulting from the loss of security that employees experience (Lewchuk et al.
2015). Such asymmetries have substantial implications for employees’ willingness/ability to act
as their own advocates, let alone on behalf of the interests of their co-workers, particularly in the
context of non-unionized workplaces (Gray 2009; Almond and Gray, Accepted Article). Even
though ES legislation typically protects employees against reprisals for seeking to enforce their
rights, under precarious employment conditions fear of retaliation is likely to grow and thus
undermines the culture needed to support a reliance on compliance measures as the principal
means of ES enforcement.
The analysis below critically interrogates the assumptions of the compliance model
through a case study of ES enforcement in Ontario drawing on the MOL’s administrative data.
While administrative data on ES complaints do not provide a direct measure of ES violations on
the ground, as complaints represent only a small fraction of overall violations, the data can
provide insight into certain characteristics of complainants and the claims they make, and the
behavior of employers once they enter into the enforcement process. Through an analysis of data
from complaints submitted in the 2014/15 fiscal year5 (unless otherwise indicated below), this
inquiry demonstrates the fallacy of several premises of a compliance framework. The analysis
focuses primarily on complainants who received entitlements for claims related to unpaid wages,
overtime pay, vacation pay/time, public holidays or public holiday pay, deductions from wages,
minimum wage, termination pay and severance pay. When focusing on settlements,
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complainants who submitted claims for unpaid wages, overtime pay, vacation pay/time, public
holidays or public holiday pay, deductions from wages, minimum wage, termination pay and
severance pay are examined. Results reveal how the situation of aggrieved employees, and the
common features of monetary ES violations, are at odds with narratives of empowered selfadvocacy among employees and the unintentionality of workplace violations.
II. Compliance in the Enforcement of Ontario’s Employment Standards Act, 2000
For the majority of employees in Ontario, the ESA establishes minimum standards in areas including
wages, hours of work, overtime pay, vacations, public holidays, and termination and severance. In
principle, the legislation was designed to provide regulatory protection for employees with little
bargaining power and particularly for those not represented by a union. The enforcement of the ESA

has long been oriented around a compliance-based approach to workplace regulation. The bulk
of enforcement resources go into the operation of an administrative process for wage recovery.6
Employees can complain to the MOL that their rights under the Act have been violated (s. 96). If
the complainant has taken the steps specified as a condition of filing a complaint (s. 96.1), the
Director may assign the complaint to an Employment Standards Officer (ESO) who has the
power to conduct an investigation (ss. 86, 91). If the ESO finds a violation, the officer has
multiple powers. In terms of wage recovery, the ESO can facilitate a settlement (s. 112), solicit a
voluntary payment from the employer, or issue an order to pay the amount owing (s. 103), which
must also include an order to pay administrative costs. There are additional powers to recover the
wages if they are not paid by the employer, including issuing orders to pay to corporate directors
(s. 106) or related employers (s. 4). These are all compliance measures in that they are limited to
enforcing the statutory obligation to pay wages without imposing any penalty for having failed to
do so.
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The ESA also provides for deterrence measures. An employer that contravenes the Act,
including non-payment of wages, commits a regulatory offense (s. 132) and becomes liable on
conviction to a fine or imprisonment. It is also a regulatory offense to fail to comply with an
order to pay wages, but it is important remember that non-payment is itself an offense. The
procedures for prosecuting regulatory offenses are outlined under the Provincial Offences Act
(S.O. 1990, c. P.33), which provides for tickets (R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 950) or formal prosecutions.
There is also a lesser deterrence measure available under the ESA, a Notice of Contravention (s.
113), but it is not available for wage violations (O.Reg. 289/01).
Reforms to the enforcement process in the 2010s that emphasized conciliatory regulation
and self-help/self-representation further tilted Ontario’s ES enforcement regime toward the
compliance model. For example, changes to the ESA in 2010 introduced a requirement for
complainants to attempt to resolve their concern directly with their employer prior to an
intervention by the MOL. Subsequent to this change, part of the MOL’s determination about
whether a complaint would be investigated include whether or not an employee sufficiently
attempts to first approach their employer with their concerns. Operating during the period of this
study, the adoption of this initial step entrenched the MOL’s emphasis on ‘self-reliance’ as the
primary mechanism through which ES complaints are to be resolved.
Simultaneous reforms to the ESA introduced an additional avenue for employees and
employers to resolve claims through facilitated settlements. Previously only non-facilitated
settlements could be reached between employees and employers. Non-facilitated settlements
require that a written agreement be provided to the ESO outlining the terms of the settlement,
and the claim is then closed without an admission of wrongdoing and without requiring the ESO
to assess whether an ES violation has occurred. Facilitated settlements involve the ESO as a
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settlement facilitator between the employee and the employer. According to the MOL’s
guidelines, the ESO is involved in “[h]elping parties understand the strengths and weaknesses of
their cases; providing parties with information on how the ESA applies to their cases; [and]
helping parties to frame their position and communicate with each other” (MOL undated: 3). The
introduction of a new form of settlement and the requirement for attempted self-resolution at the
outset of the claim process reinforce the MOL’s tendency to approach ES regulation in a manner
that assumes employer and employee responsibility for ES compliance. The emphasis now
placed on settlements reflects key assumptions of the compliance framework: that regulated
parties have the capacity to represent their interests effectively, and that most employers, if
provided the correct information, will comply with the legislation (Thomas 2009).
a. Complainants’ Reporting Behavior: Indications of Workplace Power-Imbalances
and the Risk of Exercising Voice
ESIS data on the characteristics of complainants paint a picture that runs counter to the
compliance model’s assumption of empowered self-representation and conciliatory and nonantagonistic regulation. They indicate that power imbalances in the workplace impede the
exercise of employee voice. Only a small minority of complaints with wage related violations,
consistently less than 1 in 10 each year, are filed by individuals who are on the job they are
complaining about. Such low rates of complaints from individuals in the job they are
complaining about appear to be longstanding, as the 2004 Annual Report of the Auditor General
of Ontario found a similar rate of on-the-job complaints (10%). These low rates suggest that
complainants likely perceive filing a complaint as a risky venture.
As intended by the self-resolution requirement introduced into the ESA in 2010, the vast
majority (85%) of those who made complaints with a monetary component in the 2014/15 year
reported that they contacted or tried to contact their employer with their concerns. Among those
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who entered into the formal complaints process, about one-third of those who contacted their
employers (32%) report that their employer refused to do anything, and 18% report that their
employer did not respond to their concerns. Among those who did not contact or attempt to
contact their employers about their concerns, the most frequently cited reason for non-contact
was fear. This concern was raised by almost half (41%) of those who did not attempt to get in
touch with their employer. It is likely that for many employees who experience monetary
violations of ES, fear is a major impediment to contacting their employer and/or entering into the
formal ES complaints system.
The central risk employees face if they speak out about workplace conditions is reprisal
from employers, which can entail receiving undesirable assignments and schedules, being
subject to harassment from management or co-workers, or being terminated, among other things.
Fear of reprisal is a longstanding factor in discouraging employees from initiating ES complaints
against their current employer with the MOL (Fudge 1991; Employment Standards Working
Group 1996). The risks of reprisal after complaining about a violation are shaped by the social
location of claimants. For example, employees participating in Canada’s Temporary Foreign
Worker Program are tied to a single employer, and can face non-renewal of their employment or
potentially deportation if they seek to access the ES complaints system (Faraday 2014). ESIS
data indicate that reprisal claims filed by complainants are increasing. Whereas in 2008/09,
reprisal claims were only included in 4% of all complaints with wage-theft violations, the
proportion of complaints that have a reprisal component have grown steadily across time,
increasing to 6% in 2010/11 and 9% in 2014/15. The increase in the proportion of complaints with
reprisal claims provides additional evidence to suggest that self-help requirement exacerbates the
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risks of filing an ES complaint. Reprisal claims are also more common among complainants still
working for their employer at the time that they make a complaint.
The MOL’s own data on complainants’ reporting activity thus demonstrate that claimsmaking activities are inevitably related to power imbalances in the workplace, which are welldocumented in studies on ES enforcement (Ruckelshaus 2008; Alexander 2013; Tucker 2013;
Griffith 2015). There are strong grounds to suggest that the self-help requirement discourages
some aggrieved employees from filing a complaint. This conclusion is supported by the recent,
notable decrease in the share of non-unionized employees in Ontario who file ES complaints.
Before the introduction of the self-help requirement, the number of ES complaints received by
the MOL increased, and then steadily declined after the requirement’s introduction (see Figure
2). Whereas the decline levelled off starting in 2012/13, the overall downward trend after 2010 is
notable given the increase in the absolute number of non-unionized employees in Ontario during
this period. At its peak in 2008/09, the MOL received roughly one complaint per every 175 nonunionized employees in the province, whereas in 2014/15, it received roughly one complaint per
every 285 non-unionized employees.
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Figure 2: Employment Standards Complaints Received7

ESIS data on the industrial location of complainants further counters the compliance
framework’s account of the unintentionality of violation. The data point to the relevance of
economic considerations in employers’ violations of ES. Employees who make monetary
complaints are concentrated in specific industrial sectors (see Figure 3). In 2014/15, the sectors
of accommodation and food services, construction, and management, administration and other
support services generated monetary ES complaints at a rate disproportionate to their size. The
high absolute and relative number of complaints from employees in the accommodation and food
services industry is particularly notable. The majority of complainants from this industry (54%)
are employed in full-service restaurants, and a quarter (25%) are found in limited service eating
places, such as fast food restaurants. The next most overrepresented industry among monetary
ES complaints is construction. The largest number of complaints from the construction industry
come from residential building construction and all other speciality trade contractors. The third
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most overrepresented industry grouping is referred to as management, administrative and other
support services. This category includes call centres, temporary staffing agencies, building and
grounds services, cleaning services, security services, waste disposal services, among others. The
largest number of complainants from the support services industry comes from janitorial
services, landscaping services, security guards and patrol services, and telephone call centers.
Figure 3: Industry of Validated Monetary Employment Standards Complaints8 (2014/15)

It is impossible to decipher the prevalence of violations at the industry level with administrative
data. Industries characterized by high rates of violations may generate relatively low levels of
complaints, and vice versa (Weil and Pyles 2006). The decision to file (or not file) a complaint is
related in part to the culture of an industry which shapes what violations become normalized and
routinely disregarded by workers, and those which are considered inappropriate and requiring
redress. However, the concentration of monetary ES complainants in accommodation and food
services, support services and the construction industry is consistent with findings in other
jurisdictions. In the United States, these industries have been identified as priorities for the
Federal Department of Labor’s Strategic Enforcement initiatives which aim to direct resources to

18
industries where violations are most likely to occur (Weil 2010, 10). Whereas in the
manufacturing industry, a dominant strategy of labor cost reduction is the relocation of
production to jurisdictions with less stringent regulations, employers in non-mobile service
industries pursue lower labor costs through what Weil (2010) calls fissuring, which entails the
use of sub-contracting and outsourcing. A long-time practice in the construction industry, and
now a central feature of business support services and the accommodation industry, the
offloading of labor costs onto smaller entities and labor intermediaries generates intensive
pressures and opportunities for employers to violate ES (Estlund, 2005; Weil, 2010; Bernhardt,
Spiller and Polson 2013; Fine, 2013). The industrial location of many complainants in highly
fissured industries suggests that ES violations are being driven by broader economic factors
including industrial restructuring and precarious employment rather than simply ignorance or
incompetence on the part of employers.
Complainants also overwhelmingly tend to have worked in smaller companies (see
Figure 4).9 Employees in small firms of fewer than 20 employees are grossly over represented
among complainants. Whereas only 23% of employees in Ontario work for firms of this size,
they account for a majority of monetary ES complaints at 62%. Almost forty percent (39%) of
complaints come from those working in firms that employ 6-19 people – typically small or startup companies that go beyond an individual entrepreneur. It could be that small firms lack the HR
capacities to ensure full compliance, thus supporting the compliance narrative. But, given
previous research that demonstrates how precarious employment is more prevalent in small
workplaces (Noack and Vosko 2011), due to their vulnerability to instabilities associated with
economic fluctuations,10 it is more plausible that small firms are more likely to transgress
workplace standards as a labor cost reduction strategy. Complaints related to small firms are
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more likely to include claims for unpaid wages, reflecting the financial constraints of small firms
and their greater likelihood of having employees in arrears.
Figure 4: Firm Size of Validated Monetary Employment Standards Complaints (2014/15)

In sum, the model of violations inherent in the compliance framework does not reflect important
aspects of complainants’ experience of ES violations in Ontario. Contrary to assumptions of
effective self-representation and the viability of conciliatory modes of claims resolution in the
compliance model, ESIS data point to the existence of workplace power imbalances that
discourage claims making, and limit effective self-regulation on the part of employees. The data
indicate employees’ overwhelming tendency to avoid filing complaints while still on the job, as
well as their perception or experience of the risks of reprisal associated with filing a complaint.
Claims data further demonstrate the concentration of complainants in industries and firms
characterized by high rates of precarious employment. These characteristics of ES complaints
belie the assumption that many violations are unintentional, an assumption that is central to the
compliance-based model’s prescriptions for education and awareness initiatives.
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b. The Prevalence of Egregious and Unresolved Monetary Complaints11
While administrative data do not allow for determining the most common types of violations that
occur on the ground, they do permit a number of observations regarding complaints that cast
further doubt on the compliance model’s narrative of violations as largely unintentional and
amenable to voluntarist solutions. The most common type of monetary claim submitted to the
MOL is for unpaid wages, either alone or in combination with other claims (see Figure 5).12
Unpaid wage claims are included in 60% of monetary wage-theft complaints. A similar trend
appears among validated complaints, over half (52%) of which include a claim for unpaid wages.
The prevalence of claims for unpaid wages is noteworthy because, among the various standards
that can be claimed, unpaid wages are unlikely to be simply attributable to incompetence or a
lack of information on the part of the employer. The likelihood that unpaid wages are the result
of an employer's intentional practice is underscored by their size. The median dollar value of
validated claims for unpaid wages is $793. These unpaid wage entitlements represent a
substantial portion of weekly or monthly earnings for low wage earners, and suggest that
monetary violations are typically more egregious than is acknowledged in a compliance
framework that stresses the unintentionality of violation.
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Figure 5: Prevalence of Employment Standards Claims among Validated Monetary
Complaints (2014/15)

A comparison of the median dollar value of complaints resolved via voluntary compliance versus
those for which compliance is ordered is also telling. In half of complaints with a monetary
entitlement (50%), the employer voluntary complies with the ESO’s finding and pays the
entitlement, an outcome consistent with the non-antagonistic modes of redress emphasized under
the compliance model. Complaints that are closed through voluntary compliance tend to be for
lower total claim values than those with a monetary order. Among complaints closed through
voluntary compliance, the median total entitlement is $603. In contrast, among complaints where
compliance is ordered, the median total entitlement is $1,860. Clearly, employers are most likely
to voluntarily comply with lower-value entitlements, a fact which further indicates the role of
business considerations in shaping employers’ decisions to cooperate in the enforcement process.
If voluntary compliance is not achieved, the ESO will normally issue a monetary order in
the form of an Order to Pay Wages or an Order to Compensate and/or Reinstate. Recovery rates
for monetary orders are disturbingly low. When all complaints with a monetary order during the
period between 2009/10 and 2014/15 are considered, only 39% were fully satisfied, 7% were
partially satisfied, and 54% were not satisfied. Outstanding orders are sent to collections, and of

22
those, only one in five (22%) are subsequently fully satisfied. In the case of monetary orders,
partial or non-cooperation on the part of employers is the norm rather than the exception. It is
important to note here that businesses that are bankrupt or in receivership are not issued an Order
to Pay Wages or an Order to Compensate and/or Reinstate. Recovery rates among these types of
businesses are much lower than the rates presented above. The MOL’s limited success in
recovering money for complainants further belies the assumption of cooperation in the
compliance framework.
Another possible outcome for complaints is a settlement. Employers and employees can
arrive at a settlement, with or without the ESO acting as a settlement facilitator. Not surprisingly,
the larger the submitted total claim amount, the less likely that it will be settled for 100% or
more of that amount. Facilitated settlements, which are generally used for higher-value claims,
lead to inferior outcomes for workers than non-facilitated settlements (see Figure 6). In 34% of
cases, facilitated settlements are settled for less than half of an employee's total initial claim, while
almost 25% of non-facilitated settlements are settled for less than half of an employee's total initial
claim, suggesting that the involvement of the ESO produces a resolution that is overall less favorable
to the complainant. These results lend credence to concerns voiced by analysts when compliance-

oriented reforms were introduced – that the adoption of facilitated settlements would introduce
new pressures for complainants to accept settlements below their legal entitlements.

23
Figure 6: Settlement Outcomes for Monetary ES Complaints13 (2014/15)

III. Conclusion
The compliance model is a prominent framework for the implementation of state regulation.
Recent reforms to ES enforcement in Ontario bear its influence. The MOL has sought to reduce
the ‘heavy hand’ of the state in claims resolution, whether through the provision of more
information to both employers and employees, a growing emphasis on self-help and selfregulation as the first step in claims resolution, or an emphasis on facilitated as well as nonfacilitated settlements which eschew the adjudication of legal entitlements. These developments
are premised on a view that employees, as the desired beneficiaries of regulation, are able to
assert their interests effectively, and that violations are relatively uncommon and result mainly
from ignorance and incompetence of employers. At the same time, deterrence measures based on
the notion that non-compliance is an intentional act involving an assessment of its costs and
benefits, and which therefore imposes a punishment for violators, remain a residual feature of the
Ontario’s ES enforcement regime. Deterrence measures are reserved mainly for employers who
not only violate the ESA, but ignore the authority of the state when it orders compliance.
Yet, evidence from complaints filed with the MOL paints a picture very much at odds
with the assumptions of the compliance model. The administrative data provide several
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indications of employees’ constrained ability to exercise voice when they believe they have
experienced violations. The share of Ontario employees who come forward with a complaint has
decreased in recent years, and less than 1 in 10 complainants remain on the job they are
complaining about. Additionally, reprisal claims have increased in recent years, and a majority of
complainants seeking an exemption to the self-help requirement indicate fear of their employer
as the basis for their request. Complainants with claims for monetary ES violations are
concentrated in industries and firms characterized by high rates of precarious employment,
including accommodations and food services, support services and the construction industry as
well as in small firms with less than 20 employees.
Administrative data on the features of validated monetary claims indicate that intentional,
even egregious violations are much more common than the compliance framework
acknowledges. Unpaid wages are the most common claim filed by complainants, and the median
amount of validated entitlements are for high dollar amounts that represent a substantial portion
of weekly or monthly earnings for low income earners. There are further indicators of
employers’ recalcitrance in the enforcement process. Employers are more likely to voluntarily
comply with lower dollar value claims, and only a minority of monetary orders is fully satisfied.
The findings point toward the need for models of enforcement that are not premised on
the initial assumption of unintentionality of violations, and the corresponding assumption that
enforcement should always begin with education and other compliance measures and only
escalate when those measures have failed, as is the case in Ayres and Braithwaite’s enforcement
pyramid. In light of changes to the organization of employment that deepen insecurity for
employees and augment employer power, heavily reliance on compliance over deterrence is
unlikely to effectively prevent or remedy ES violations. Effective, evidence-based workplace
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regulation requires enforcement models that recognize workplace power imbalances, and how
different industries organize employment in ways that create pressures and opportunities for ES
violations.

NOTES
1

Monetary ES violations refer to the phenomenon of employees not being paid the wages and
other monetary benefits to which they are legally entitled.
2
For a discussion of similar problems in the US Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division
administrative database, as well as potential solutions, see Morantz (2014).
3
There is a sharp distinction in Canada between regulatory offenses and crimes. Provinces can
enact regulatory laws in respect of matters within their constitutional competence, which
includes employment, and punish violators by fine and/or imprisonment. However, only the
federal government has the constitutional authority to enact criminal laws. The difference
between crimes and regulatory offenses is not just a matter of semantics because of the much
greater social opprobrium that is attached to committing a crime as opposed to a regulatory
offense.
4
Employers operating in this environment may also be more ignorant and incompetent than
those operating is less highly competitive environments.
5
Following the budget cycle of the provincial government, the fiscal year runs from April 1 to
March 31. 2014/15 is the most recent fiscal year for which outcome information is available for
the majority of submitted complaints.
6
Workers can also bring civil actions to enforce ESA claims on the theory that ESA obligations
are implied terms of the contract of employment. Boland v. APV Canada Inc., 2005 CanLII
3384 (ON SCDC).
7
Source: Complaints received from MOL (2006, 2014), non-unionized Ontario employees from
Statistics Canada Labor Force Survey (2004-2014).
8
Industry information is available for 95% of monetary ES complaints. Complaints that were
withdrawn or settled are less likely to have industry information available than complaints with
other outcomes.
9
As firm size information is only available for 60% of monetary ES complaints, this analysis
should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, it corresponds with the general trends related to
firm size identified by the MOL in their reports.
10
Among small and medium size businesses in Canada, only 62 percent survived for three years
and 51 percent of firms survived for five years; survival rates are even lower among microenterprises (Industry Canada 2012, 2013).
11
In this section, the analysis is limited to complaints that include monetary claims related to
unpaid wages, overtime pay, vacation pay/time, public holiday pay, deductions/ temporary help
agency (THA) fees, minimum wages, termination pay and severance pay (collectively referred to
as monetary complaints).
12
A complaint can include a claim relating to one or more employment standards.
13
In this graph a 2% margin around the claim amount was allowed in order to accommodate
inconsistent rounding and decimal use in the data, which resulted in many entitlements that had a
$1-2 difference from the claim amount.
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